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GLOBAL ENCOUNTER. 
RIVARLY BETWEEN ISLAMIC STATE 
AND AL-QAEDA OVER THE SUPREMACY 
OF TH GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
In 2015 the attention of the international community remains strongly 
directed to the events in the Middle East, especially because international 
terrorist groups have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to commit terrorist 
attacks, not only in the region but also in other parts of the world. However, 
since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) announced the creation of 
the caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and then took over Mosul, there have been 
many doubts about how to describe and evaluate this group in relation to 
al-Qaeda, a global organisation associating jihadists, which the international 
community got to know on the occasion of terrorist attacks carried out in 
the West in the late 90s of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st 
century.
It seems that the Islamic State combines the possibility of projection of 
military operations in the region with the abilities and potential of performing 
them far from the territory of the Middle East. Of course, al-Qaeda has also 
shown that it has these capabilities, however, in the case of the Islamic State 
it seems that they can become incomparably bigger in the future, with the 
formation of quasi-state structures.
Although the national and international literature describes the objectives 
and results of operations of al-Qaeda very broadly, as well as the expansion 
policy of the Islamic State, it is not focused on a comparative analysis of 
these two organisations. On the one hand, it may be connected with the 
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multidimensionality of the problems and an unusual dynamics of a series 
of interrelated conflicts in the Middle East. On the other hand, al-Qaeda 
was the source of the emergence of the Islamic State, and for this reason 
the separation from the structures of this organisation seems, in principle, 
to be often an impossible task. That is why, in the literature we do not find 
a holistic analysis of this issue, taking into account the comparison of these 
two organisations. We can encounter many more forecasts concerning the 
acquisition of monopoly over ‘global jihad’ by the Islamic State.
The aim of this publication is to show common features and differences 
between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the context of the rivalry of 
these two organisations. On the basis of a wide historical and ideological 
perspective, the article contextualises the creation of the Islamic State 
terrorist organisation, by means of which it seeks to understand why, in 
contrast to al-Qaeda, it is now able to so effectively gather and use its power 
and whether it will be possible in the future. In addition, for the purposes 
of this publication it seems necessary to show the origins of the organisation 
of the Islamic State, the first causes of its functioning in the structures of 
al-Qaeda which ultimately led to competition between the two organisations 
for hegemony over the global jihadist movement.
1.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
FROM THE STRUCTURE OF AL-QAEDA 
The history of the structures which evolved to ultimately create the 
current organisation of the Islamic State date back to the late 90s of the 20th 
century. Then Abu Musab al-Zarqawi created an organisation called Jamaat 
al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (JTWJ)1, next in 2004 it was renamed Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri became its main leader. It was he who extended the 
action plan of the organisation by Iraq, where a caliphate, an Islamic state 
based on Sharia laws, was to be established. In 2006 al-Qaeda in Iraq was 
joined by other groups of jihadists who declared the creation of the Islamic 
1 Zelin, A.Y. 2014. The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global 
jihadist movement. Research Notes. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
no.  20, June 2014. Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Docu-
ments/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf, p. 1.
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State organisation of Iraq (ISI), which was later renamed the Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)2.
The international community did not pay much attention to the activities of 
the Islamic State before 2013, which meant that the organisation was shrouded 
in mystery both in the Middle East and in the West. Also, not much attention 
was paid to the change of the name from al-Qaida in Iraq to the Islamic State 
in Iraq and the level of ambition of the members of the organisation elite, 
concealed under this action, remained entirely unnoticed. It is now known that 
the name change was a much greater event than it was perceived at that time. 
It signalled the beginning of an ambitious political project – the creation of 
a caliphate, which would be a prelude to further expansion3.
Table 1
The evolution of the names of the Islamic State and the leaders of the organisation 
Date Name Date Leader
1999–
2004
Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – JTWJ, 
Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad 1999–
2006
Abu Musab 
az-Zarqawi2004–
2006
al-Qaeda in Iraq – AQI;
al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers
2006 Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin, Mujahedeen Shura Council 2006–
2010
Abu Ayyub al-Masri
Abu Omar 
al-Qurashi 
Al-Baghdadi1
2006–
2013 Islamic State of Iraq – ISI
2013– 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham – ISIS;
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
– ISIL;
Islamic State – IS
2010– Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi
a)  In July 2007, the United States acknowledged the need to consider whether Abu Omar 
al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi was a fictional person; Gordon, M.R. 2007. Leader of Al Qaeda 
group in Iraq was fictional, U.S. military says. New York Times. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/world/africa/18iht-iraq.4.6718200.html?_r=0
Source: Own study on the basis of Zelin, A.Y. 2014. The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda 
for supremacy of the global jihadist movement. Research Notes. The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, no. 20, June 2014. 
2 Terrill, A.W. 2014. Understanding the strengths and vulnerabilities of ISIS. Parameters, 
vol. 44, no. 3., pp. 14–15.
3 Bunzel, C. 2015. From paper state to caliphate: the ideology of the Islamic State. The 
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, no. 19, 
March 2015, p. 4.
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In early 2006 other jihad groups joined al-Qaeda in Iraq and together 
they set up the Mujahedeen Shura Council. In October 2006 the Council 
declared the establishment of The Islamic State of Iraq – ISI. In the period 
from 2006 to 2013, with the name change, the way of functioning of the 
organisation underwent transformation. It abstained from armed attacks, 
focusing on internal consolidation and the adaptation of its tactics to new 
realities. In 2010 Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai was 
appointed to lead what was then known as the Islamic State in Iraq. Now, 
as the leader of the Islamic State, he is known under the pseudonym Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi. It should also be noted that during this period the ISI 
suffered a number of serious setbacks in the fight against the armies of the 
anti-terrorist coalition formed to fight against al-Qaeda. By the end of 2011 
the group was marginalised in Iraq, but after the withdrawal of the US troops 
from Iraq, the ISI gradually regenerated its structures, taking advantage of the 
fact that the country plunged into a deep socio-economic and political crisis4.
At the same time in which the Islamic State was building its structures 
focusing on recruitment activities, internal consolidation and transformation 
of military tactics and strategy, al-Qaeda was actually totally involved in 
fighting with the anti-terrorist coalition under the leadership of the United 
States. In addition, in May 2011, it lost its leader Osama bin Laden. Since the 
death of its military and spiritual leader al-Qaeda was perceived a as moribund 
group. Despite this, it did not want to give up the position of the leader of 
the jihad movement, trying to compete with ISIS. Ayman al-Zawahiri tried to 
counter the increase of the power of ISIS in the Middle East by announcing 
the creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which so far 
has not produced the desired effect, which was to increase the scope of the 
territorial impact of the group5.
In April 2013 overt hostility between ISIS and al-Qaeda broke out, with 
the announcement by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi of the extension of the Islamic 
State in Iraq to the territory of Syria and changing the name of the group into 
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Also he revealed that the organisation 
merged with the an-Nusra Front, but the leader of the Front Abu Mohammed 
al-Jawal issued a statement denying such a merger. This event caused another 
4 Terrill, A.W. op. cit., pp. 14–15.
5 Moore, J. Al-Qaeda losing ‘deadly competition’ with ISIS. Newsweek. [Online] Avail-
able at: http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-decline-syria-affiliate-nusra-front-consid-
ers-split-311348 [Accessed: 25 April 2015]; Saltman, E.M., Winter, Ch. 2014. Islamic 
State: the changing face of modern jihadism. Quilliam, p.10.
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argument between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda and led to contention for 
the subordination of individual jihadist cells6.
Since the proclamation of the caliphate by the Islamic State in 2014, the 
organisation extremely quickly became economically self-sufficient thanks 
to the creation of a sophisticated financial model which, in contrast to the 
actions of al-Qaeda, stresses the importance of autonomy and separateness 
of the organisation in relation to other structures. The IS has developed 
a system of self-sufficiency, mainly production self-sufficiency, but also sales 
of crude oil resources. In addition, ISIS has got not only a well-developed 
economic mechanism, but also impressive operational capabilities which, 
when combined with propaganda, are extremely effective, by which the group 
represents some kind of a factor which has changed the ‘global game’ of 
terrorist organisations7. However, despite the fact that such a statement is 
obvious, because the Islamic State has undoubtedly shaken the global arena 
of jihad, it is not clear what this will mean for the face and actions of Islamic 
terrorism in the coming years, and what the consequences of this will be for 
the international community.
We can see numerous differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State. The discrepancies are visible not only in the mode of action but also in 
the human potential of both organisations, as well as the leadership style. The 
main difference comes from the origin of the founders of the group. Zarqawi 
and other leaders of the Islamic State come from at least upper middle class, 
and many of them, like the leader, have higher education. Despite the fact 
that Bin Laden himself came from an aristocratic Saudi Arabia family8, his 
closest associates came or come from poorer, less educated backgrounds. 
However, frictions between the leaders were not caused by the questions of 
the origin and education, but rather by Zarqawi’s extreme views. Already 
during the first meeting of the leaders in Afghanistan in 1999, bin Laden 
was distrustful and suspicious of the younger associate. But Zarqawi settled 
in another part of Afghanistan, away from bin Laden and al-Qaeda program, 
as a result of which the concerns of the al-Qaeda leader weakened. It is 
believed that bin Laden from the beginning tried to fully control Zarqawi, 
6 Zelin, A.Y. The War…, p. 4; Terrill, A.W. op. cit., p.15.
7 Cockburn, P. 2015. Państwo Islamskie. [The jihadis return: ISIS and the new Sunni upris-
ing.] Translated from English by M. Bielik; introduction and substantial consultation 
D. Boćkowski, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy PWN, p. 90.
8 Villamarí n Pulido, L.A. 2008. Sieć Al-Kaida. [Al-Qaeda network.] Translated by Danuta 
Zasada, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wołoszański, p. 107.
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demanding swearing a religious oath of allegiance (bay’ah)9, but the offer 
was repeatedly rejected. Zarqawi yielded to bin Laden only in 2004, taking 
an oath and changing the name of his group to al-Qaeda in the Land of Two 
Rivers, widely known as al-Qaeda in Iraq. At that time this fact could cement 
the relationship between the two organisations, but current events show that 
the aim of the al-Qaeda leader has not been achieved, and it was then that 
the Islamic State started to gain in autonomy10.
Being a part of the network of al-Qaida in Iraq meant that the group 
controlled the resources and the flow of foreign fighters, which helped it win 
the loyalty of society. This is important because in this way AQI controlled 
a number of informal structures and was able to affect future generations of 
the jihadist movement. As a result, one of the key factors that differentiate 
the Islamic State from al-Qaeda now is a generational gap11.
It should be also noted that, unlike the leaders of other cells of al-Qaeda, 
the current emir of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was appointed in 2010, 
has never publicly sworn the oath of allegiance to Zawahiri12. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that he was set to become self-sufficient and in the long run 
to achieve hegemony over the jihadist movement by means of the organisation 
then known as the Islamic State in Iraq. It seems that it is on the right track, 
though the methods of the pursuit of this objective seem to be brittle. The 
Islamic State continuously creates its own network of interconnected, terrorist 
groups, modelled on the known activities of al-Qaeda. At the same time it 
applies proselytic actions, modern methods of recruiting fighters, improves 
fundraising methods, and above all tries to build effectively functioning quasi-
state structures13.
 9 Bay’ah – an Islamic oath of allegiance, obedience sworn to a caliph, the leader of the 
Muslims; Arabowie. Słownik encyklopedyczny. [Arabs. Encyclopedic dictionary.] 2001. 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 99. Only an individual can take the oath, 
that is why after Zarqawi’s death, bay’ah was canceled, which technically meant the 
lack of subordination in relation to al-Qaeda, although in practice it was subordinated 
to the al-Qaeda until February 2014.
10 Zelin, A.Y. The War…, pp. 1–2.
11 Ibidem, p. 4.
12 Ibidem, pp. 1–2.
13 The IS has a number of attributes of statehood: the territory inhabited by nearly six 
million people, its own armed forces, police, law and judiciary, the capital, flag, leader, 
it intends to print its own documents and money, has its own media, press, builds 
a system of medical care and education. Boćkowski, D. 2015. Wstęp do polskiego 
wydania. Państwo Islamskie u wrót Europy. [Preface to the Polish edition. The Islamic 
State at the gates of Europe.] In: Cockburn, P. Państwo Islamskie. [The jihadis return: 
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Figure 1
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Al Qaeda
in the Islamic
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AQC
central of Al Qaeda
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Al Qaeda
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(from 2014)
India
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Al Qaeda
in the Arabian
Peninsula
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Al Murabitoun
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confirmation)
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Source: own study.
2. AL-QAEDA VERSUS THE ISLAMIC STATE
In the 80s and 90s of the 20th century numerous regional groups of 
extremist and fundamentalist shared a very general ideological outline as 
well as funds and resources provided by Osama bin Laden. A clear division 
between Al-Qaeda and its factions, that is the split in the jihadist movement 
occurred only after the events of 11 September 2001. However, in the initial 
phase of the process, most of them, despite independence, maintained 
friendly relations with the network of al-Qaeda. The current situation seems 
ISIS and the new Sunni uprising.] Translated from English by M. Bielik; introduction 
and substantial consultation D. Boćkowski, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy PWN, p. 34.
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to point to the ultimate sanction of the split in the global jihadist movement 
which led to rivalry for hegemony between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. 
The presentation of both similarities and differences in the functioning of 
both organisations requires first of all an analysis of ideological issues, the 
course of action, recruitment of new members, use of media and methods 
of financing.
In ideological matters the Islamic State it is very similar to other terrorist 
groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The differences are visible only in 
the approach to the proper time and conditions necessary to establish the 
caliphate14. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State identify themselves with 
the movement in the Islamic political thought known as Jihad-Salafism 
and jihadism15. In fact, both groups refer to the theology of Salafism and 
present similar nature of jihad, but the Islamic State does it in a much stricter 
way. In contrast to al-Qaeda, it is absolutely uncompromising in matters of 
doctrine, absolutely and unquestionably referring to the idea of Salafism16. 
In addition, the differentia specifica of the Islamic State seems to lie in the 
fact that religion and ideology play a much more subjective role, which may 
result from the already mentioned differences in backgrounds and education 
of leaders of the groups.
 The difference is reflected in the chosen path to the ultimate goal which 
is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The main enemy of al-Qaeda is 
the United States, which is seen as the cause of all conflicts in the region. The 
overthrow of the corrupt, apostate regimes in the Middle East and replacing 
them with ‘real’ Islamic rules becomes of secondary importance. In turn, 
the Islamic State does not apply a similar strategy, seeking opponents in its 
environment, at the regional level. The road to the main purpose of the Islamic 
State is not through actions directed against the United States, but against 
apostate regimes in the Arab world. These actions were initiated against the 
regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Prime Minister Haider 
14 Friedland, E. 2015. Special Report. The Islamic State. Clarion Project. [Online] 10 May 
2015. Available at:  http://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/islamic-state-isis-
isil-factsheet-1.pdf, pp. 13–14.
15 Jihadism is a neologism which was adopted by the scientific community in the late 90s 
of the 20th century and has permanently entered common use. Jihadism is a global 
social movement, in its assumptions it is utopian, anti-Western, based on the use of 
violence. See Khosrokhavar, F. 2009. Inside jihadism. Understanding jihadi movements 
worldwide. Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers.
16 Bunzel, C. 2015. From paper state to caliphate: the ideology of the Islamic State. The 
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, no. 19, 
March 2015, p. 7.
MARTA STEMPIEŃ206
al-Abadi in Iraq. Thus, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are fundamentally 
different in terms of the perception of their main opponents, and used 
strategies. Their fight tactics are also not the same. The list of enemies of 
the Islamic State is much longer than that of al-Qaeda, and includes Jews, 
Shiites, Zaidis (and other factions of Shia Islam), Yezidis, Alawites, Kurdish 
and terrorist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hezbollah17, 
or some factions of al-Qaeda, for example, the Support Front for the People 
of Al-Sham (the al-Nusra Front). Al-Qaeda also regards Shiites as apostates, 
but killing them is perceived as too extreme18, that is harmful to the broader 
concept of jihad which should be in the first place directed against the West19. 
A short-term aim of the Islamic State is the struggle in Syria and Iraq, 
a medium-term gaol consists in the consolidation and extension of control in 
the territory of Iraq and Syria, and taking over control of neighbouring Sunni 
countries. A long-term goal, and also the ultimate one, is identical with the 
aspirations of al-Qaeda, that is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate20.
Thus, the differences in strategies and techniques of both organisations 
may result from the desire to control the territory and constantly strengthen 
and expand its position. By controlling a particular territory the IS can build 
an army, and by the army it can control more territory. For this purpose, 
hierarchical structure of counsellors, ministers and military commanders on 
the conquered areas are created21. The IS has already established a relatively 
high degree of stability of the created local organisational structures22. 
Leaving the ideological issues aside, the functioning of the IS, as a kind 
of a quasi-state on the occupied territory, is quite conventional insurgent 
behaviour, characteristic for many insurrectionary movements, including 
those of a fundamentalist nature. The direction in which these new structures 
will be developed is less obvious. On the other hand, al-Qaeda sees a long-
term objective in gaining territory and the construction of the caliphate, and 
that is why it focuses on the dispersion and fragmentation of international 
17 The Islamic State considers Shia Islam as perversion, like all other factions of Islam 
which are not compatible with the Salafist rhetoric of the organisations.
18 Bunzel, C. op. cit., p. 11.
19 Byman, D., Williams, J. 5015. Al-Qaeda vs. ISIS: the battle for the soul of jihad. 
[Online] Newsweek 27 March 2015. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-
vs-isis-battle-soul-jihad-317414 [Accessed: 13 June 2015].
20 Friedland, E. op. cit., p. 13.
21 Ibidem, pp. 17–19.
22 See Mecham, Q. 2015. How much of a state is the Islamic State? In: Islamism in the 
IS age. POMEPS Studies 12. [Online] 17 March 2015. Available at: http://pomeps.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/03/POMEPS_Studies_12_ISAge_Web.pdf, pp. 20–24.
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structures, and not on building local structures23. These differences in the used 
tactics reflect the differences in strategies. Al-Qaeda appreciates a massive 
scale operations, therefore makes dramatic attacks on strategic and symbolic 
targets, such as the World Trade Centre. In contrast, the Islamic State evolves 
with the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and the tactics of the organisation adapts 
to the circumstances of these wars. The IS seeks to gain massive strength, and 
terrorism, in this context, is not a punctual action as in the case of al-Qaeda, 
it represents a part of the revolutionary war in which all methods of struggle 
are allowed24.
The differences in the selection of techniques and perception of enemies, 
including mainly Shiite communities, may result from the fact that certainly the 
organisational structures of the Islamic State are much more heterogeneous 
than those of al-Qaeda. Militants from various countries and backgrounds 
work in the structures of the IS, and the only motive required to join the 
ranks of the group is a declaration of readiness to fight with the infidels and 
total devotion to the cause. This issue is also related to the dissimilarity of 
ways of recruiting fighters. The Islamic State has implemented a number of 
methods adapted to all environments. These are actions on local, regional, 
and international levels. The recruitment of fighters is not limited to the 
territory of the Middle East and North Africa, but it is also extended to other 
parts of the world, including primarily Europe. In this way, the organisation 
shows the world that it is exempt from punishment for breaking international 
law25 and law of the widely understood West.
In addition, the IS uses a variety of techniques to recruit, ranging from 
proselytizing26 taking a form of exerting pressure, the use of threats, torture, 
to creating an apparent concern for society: providing material and social 
benefits to those in need. It recruits women, and even forces them to send 
23 See Kosmynka, S. 2012. Od Boga do terror: rola religii w ideologii dżihadyzmu na przy-
kładzie organizacji Al-Kaida. [From God to terror: the role of religion in the ideology of 
jihadism on the example of al-Qaeda organisation.] Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Łódzkiego, pp. 251–264.
24 Byman, D., Williams, J. op. cit. [Accessed: 13 June 2015].
25 See Lankosz, K., Chorośnicki, M., Czubik, P. 2005. Walka z terroryzmem w świetle 
prawa międzynarodowego. [The fight against terrorism under international law.] 2nd ed. 
Bielsko-Biała: Wyższa Szkoła Administracji.
26 Proselytism, understood as an attempt to recruit new followers of a particular religion 
or idea, or as converting others to one’s faith. Proselytism may take a right or wrong 
form, but the most dangerous of its form is exerting pressure or coercion to accept the 
principles of the faith. 
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their children to camps training new militants27. The organisation sees in this 
action a long-term investment which will be used to build loyalty and create 
a modern staff of fighters who will perceive violence as their way of life28. In 
addition, women play a different role in the organisation of the Islamic State. 
In February 2014 the IS announced the creation of the Al-Khansaa Brigade 
consisting solely of women whose main task is to enforce strict rules of Sharia 
law. However, according to the organisation, women should be primarily 
mothers and housewives, while men – militants. If the roles are mixed, then 
foundation of humanity will be affected leading to instability29.
On the other hand, the international activities have led to the recruitment 
of several thousand fighters fascinated by the ideology of jihadism among 
Western countries. The Islamic State uses all means to attract young 
Europeans. A recruiting network is created by supporters from different 
countries and people returning from the Middle East with a mission to 
recruit new fighters. Network operations are facilitated by the progressive 
Islamisation of Western Europe30. Special schools are even created for newly 
recruited foreign jihadists31. This does not change the fact that the extremists 
associated with societies of Western Europe after arriving in a zone occupied 
by the Islamic State do not become a fighting ‘vanguard’ of the Muslim 
27 Islamic State recruits 400 children since January: Syria monitor. Reuters [Online] 
24 March 2015. Available at:  http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/24/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-children-idUSKBN0MK0U520150324 [Accessed: 7 April 2015]; Raising 
tomorrow’s mujahideen’: the horrific world of Isis’s child soldiers. Extracted from: 
Stern,  J., Berger, J.M. 2015. ISIS: The state of terror. HarperCollins. Available at:   
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/10/horror-of-isis-child-soldiers-state-of-
terror [Accessed: 13 June 2015].
28 Raising tomorrow’s mujahideen’: the horrific world of Isis’s child soldiers. Extracted 
from: Stern, J., Berger, J. M. 2015. ISIS: The state of terror. HarperCollins. [Online] 
Available at:   http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/10/horror-of-isis-child-
soldiers-state-of-terror [Accessed: 13 June 2015].
29 Women and jihad; Caliphate calling. The Economist, vol. 414, no. 8927, 28 February 
2015.
30 The population of Muslims, including immigrants and people born in Western Europe 
amount to approximately 20 million out of the 500 million inhabitants. Johnson, T. 
2011. Europe: Integrating Islam. [Online] 25 July 2011. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/
religion/europe-integrating-islam/p8252 [Accessed: 8 April 2015].
31 Boćkowski, D. 2015. Wstęp do polskiego wydania. Państwo Islamskie u wrót Europy. 
[Preface to the Polish edition. The Islamic State at the gates of Europe.] In: Cock-
burn,  P. Państwo Islamskie. [The jihadis return: ISIS and the new Sunni uprising.] 
Translated from English by M. Bielik; introduction and substantial consultation 
D. Boćkowski, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy PWN, p. 34.
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community. Frustrated with the exclusion from the society of the West, guided 
by the need to return to the tradition and culture, they become the lowest 
level of the organisational hierarchy of the Islamic State32.
Not only recruitment activities of the IS significantly differ from those 
used by al-Qaeda. It pertains also to the information transfer techniques, used 
both for the transfer of data on the activities and to recruit new members. The 
Islamic State leads a massive propaganda campaign using all modern means 
of communication, including Twitter33, Facebook or YouTube, making it much 
more effective than the efforts of al-Qaeda in this matter 34. The organisation 
also publishes an English-language magazine entitled Dabiq35 and program 
manifestos published by the women’s Al-Khansaa Brigade, while al-Qaeda 
mainly produces long films presenting the considerations about various 
aspects of jihad of main ideologists of the group, which are then transferred 
to the media. Certainly, the Islamic State media messages are more attractive 
for numerous young, frustrated fanatics of the idea of jihad. Undoubtedly the 
progressive process of globalisation and computerisation has enabled leaders 
of the group to maximise the potential of new technologies and social media. 
Modern technologies are also used not only to convey verbal aggression, but 
also to promote the contents of macabre films, such as those showing mass 
and individual murders, including of American journalists James Foley and 
Stephen Sotloff or Briton David Haines.
In addition, another factor conditioning the attractiveness of the Islamic 
State is also strong motivating of actions by political and social considerations, 
whereas in the case of al-Qaida primarily by hatred of Western civilisation. 
Leaders of the groups pose as defenders of the Sunni community, not only 
because of the religious community, but also for the sake of politico-socio-
cultural actions. They try to create the educational, tax and health care system 
under the black flag of the Islamic Caliphate.
The methods of financing of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are largely 
convergent, but each of them constitutes a different percentage of the total 
32 Roy, O. 2007. Islamic terrorist radicalisation in Europe. In: Amghar, S., Boubekeur, A., 
Emerson, M. eds. European Islam challenges for public policy and society. Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies, pp. 55–56.
33 On the use of Twitter by the IS see Berger, J.M., Morgan, J. 2015. The ISIS Twitter cen-
sus. Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter. The Brookings 
Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, no. 20, March 2015.
34 After the atrocities; terror and Islam. The Economist, vol. 414, no. 8921, 17 January 
2015, p. 21.
35 So far 9 issues of the magazine have been published.
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revenues of the organisation. The IS, currently considered the richest terrorist 
organisation, derives its revenue primarily from smuggling crude oil (at least 
a million dollars a day). It is supplemented by funds from extortion, kidnapping 
for ransom and the tax system introduced in the occupied territories. The 
group is largely self-sufficient, donations constitute only a small percentage of 
its income. Despite the diversification of income, important differences can 
be indicated in obtaining financing for the activities of both organisations. 
The network built by al-Qaeda is more decentralised and fluid, which may be 
due to the long period of its operation. Moreover, in contrast to the Islamic 
State, donations represent a significant percentage of revenues of al-Qaeda, 
the CIA has calculated that it is approximately 30 million USD annually36.
3. WILL AL-QAEDA LOSE THE RIVALRY WITH THE ISLAMIC STATE?
The main reason for the overt hostility between al-Qaida and the 
organisation now known as the Islamic State may be considered Al-Baghdadi’s 
disobedience, who decided to take control over Syria without the consent of 
the leader of al-Qaeda. This move surprised the headquarters of al-Qaeda, 
which in 2014 finally and formally distanced itself from its subsidiary 
in Iraq and Syria, ending years of difficult cooperation between the two 
organisations37. 
However, disputes between religious leaders and leaders of both 
organisations had lasted for a long time and had not been related only to 
the issue of the operation area. They had often been disputes on ideological, 
philosophy of life, political and social issues. Zarqawi already felt that 
the only way to save the umma – the global Islamic community – was its 
cleansing, while Ayman al-Zawahiri believes that not Muslims themselves 
are the problem, but apostate institutions which should be replaced by new 
ones – the true Islamic governments38. This fundamental divergence between 
the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda can be reduced to the difference between the 
doctrinal and more strategic perspective and differences in attitudes towards 
36 Friedland, E. op. cit., p. 20; Saltman, E.M., Winter, Ch. op. cit., pp. 10–11, 47–51.
37 Baghdadi was a leader of a section of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. For this reason, he should not 
lay claims to al-Sham (the Levant) which was under the control of another branch of 
Al-Qaeda – the al-Nusra Front.
38 Byman, D. 2015. Terrorism in Africa: the imminent threat to the United States. 29 April 
2015. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/testimony/2015/ 
04/29-terrorism-in-africa-byman/byman-aq-v-is-hsc-042315.pdf, p. 4.
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building Islamic institutions and reign. Currently, the IS recognises that 
al-Zawahiri has deviated from the path chosen by bin Laden, which makes 
his leadership illegitimate. Leaders of the Islamic State consider themselves 
the only, true heirs of the legacy of bin Laden and al-Qaeda, which they carry 
out under a new name of the Islamic State caliphate39.
Al-Qaeda has been impaired as a result of counter-terrorism actions in the 
region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Former leaders of the group are dimmed 
by the new generation of jihadists, presenting more radical views that fit well 
the political climate prevailing in some Arab countries, struggling with the 
effects of revolts which began in 2010 and 2011. Al-Qaeda now has competition 
from the IS in Iraq, Syria and Libya. In addition, in Nigeria and Egypt certain 
factions of jihadist groups have announced an alliance with the IS.
It should be remembered that in spite of the above factors, al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qaeda’s affiliates in various regions now 
control more territory than at any other point in history. According to some 
scholars, al-Qaeda has never been on the path to defeat, and the prediction 
of the downfall of the organisation after bin Laden’s death were premature 
just like the current voices about its collapse. The presence of branches of the 
organisation in different geographical regions (Fig. 1) can be evidence for this, 
as well as for the territorial proliferation of the organisation. However, on 
the other hand, this number may be proof of the consolidation of previously 
existing militant groups operating in the area, and not of the creation of new 
structures. Moreover, just like the Islamic State, they can detach themselves 
from the head office and start to compete with it. It does not change the fact 
that al-Qaeda is present in many different regions of the world40.
Analyzing al-Qaeda as a network of interconnected cells, it is clear that 
its performance seems to remain at a good level. It is focused on profits in 
Syria and Yemen, as well as potentially in Libya if its unofficial branch, Ansar 
al-Sharia, is able to regain the strength lost after the establishment of the 
Islamic State. The headquarters of al-Qaeda has similar hopes connected 
the activities of the al-Nusra Front in Syria. In spite of this, if you look 
at the other branches – Al-Shabaab, AQIM, as well as AQIS – everything 
look less positive. However, if key data and resources of the network are 
successfully moved away from Pakistan, where the position of al-Qaeda has 
39 Zelin, A.Y., The War…, pp. 1–5.
40 Humud, C.E. 2014. Al Qaeda-affiliated groups: Middle East and Africa. Congressional 
Research Service Report, 10 October 2014. Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
R43756.pdf, pp. 24–25.
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significantly weakened, then the chances of survival and further development 
of the organisation will greatly improve41. 
The Islamic State takes advantage of this situation and does not conceal 
the competition with al-Qaeda and usurps the right to control the branches 
subordinate to the head office of al-Qaeda (al Qaeda Central – AQC). Such 
actions have already produced the effect of obtaining a group of Taliban – 
Al Qaeda members from Afghanistan and Pakistan, who have sworn allegiance 
to al-Baghdadi. Desertions of members of organisations subordinate to 
al-Qaeda have also happened in the case of the al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb. Thus, the 
Islamic State also seems to understand the need to establish its cells in other 
countries, and wherever the call for jihad is or will be present, rivalry will 
also appear there42.
Although al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share a common ideological 
program, aiming at the ultimate establishment of an Islamic caliphate, the IS 
is a lot younger, more radical in its actions and certainly has a faster operating 
structure than al-Qaeda. However, does this rapid pace of action also mean 
greater efficiency? An unambiguous answer to this question at the moment 
is a  difficult task due to the multidimensional nature of this competition, 
connected with many conflicts in the Middle East. It seems, however, that 
the IS will retain the upper hand, so long as it does not suffer any significant 
territorial losses and can present its structures as those that build an Islamic 
caliphate better than al-Qaeda and its official affiliates. In addition, the 
Islamic State also gains the support of many important jihadist groups, for 
example, Nigerian Boko Haram and Egyptian Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which 
have formally pledged allegiance to the IS and may be regarded as official 
cells of the organisation and the areas controlled by them as ‘provinces’ of the 
Islamic State caliphate. Although the media attention is focused on the Islamic 
State, al-Qaeda’s subsidiaries have also achieved successes in recent times. This 
applies to the activities of AQAP in Yemen and the al-Nusra Front in Syria43.
The rivalry of the two strongest jihadist movements, which have almost 
identical strategic objectives, is a fact, because first of its signs are already 
visible. The IS and al-Qaeda are divided mainly because of the divergence of 
priorities. Al-Qaeda is focused on attacking Western targets and anti-terrorist 
coalition forces, while the IS intends first to overthrow the systems in Middle 
41 Zelin, A.Y. ICSR Insight: The State of al-Qaeda. Available at: http://icsr.info/2015/04/
icsr-insight-state-al-qaeda/ [Accessed: 30 April 2015].
42 Zelin, A.Y. ICSR Insight…; Byman, D. op. cit., p. 6.
43 Byman, D. op. cit., p. 6.
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Eastern countries by military means. However, the tactics has changed after 
August 2014 when the international coalition forces started conducting raids. 
Just like al-Qaeda, the Islamic State has begun calling for attacks on Western 
countries. Given the attractiveness of the IS for the community of jihadists 
coming from the West it is a disturbing tendency. Potentially, the group may 
develop the ability to attack targets located at greater distances.
It seems that al-Qaeda has already lost its monopoly of the leader of 
global jihadism, though in the eyes of many people it remains a symbol of 
terrorism44. Furthermore, the group which descends from this organisation 
is more and more often labelled with this name. However, what makes the 
Islamic State more attractive for Islamic militants? Certainly, one of the 
factors is the heterogeneity of the IS, because fighters from around the world, 
not only from the Middle East, operate in its structures, on the other hand, 
it is a group of very different origins. For this reason, leaders of al-Qaeda 
wonder whether they have sufficient capacity to win the ideological war with 
the future generation of the global jihadist movement.
On the one hand, the rivalry and mutual fight among jihadist groups 
can be helpful for counter terrorist activities and cause the separation of 
the available resources. In addition, such chaos could destroy the idea of 
global jihadism, thereby reducing slightly the risk for Western countries. On 
the other hand, excessive competition of jihadists can be a great threat to 
the West. If the resources of both the ‘old guard’ of al-Qaeda and the IS do 
not change, increased competition of these two jihadist networks, caused by 
endless conflicts, may constitute the most dangerous scenario. This rivalry 
may cause the increased demand for spectacular attacks against the West, 
which could serve as a confirmation of the dominance of one of the parties 
as well as a means of propaganda operations.
SUMMARY
The face of radicalism has significantly changed since the events of 
11 September 2001, after which al-Qaeda was a monopolist in the world of 
Islamic jihadism. Currently in the international arena there are numerous 
terrorist groups of different sizes, which not only cooperate, but often 
44 See Kosmynka, S. 2012. Od Boga do terroru: rola religii w ideologii dżihadyzmu na 
przykładzie organizacji al-Kaida. [From God to terror: the role of religion in the ideology 
of jihadism on the example of al-Qaeda organisation.] Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Łódzkiego, pp. 251–264.
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compete with one another. An example of such competition is a conflict 
between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. These organisations are currently at 
open war for domination over the global Jihadist community. Undoubtedly, 
the IS currently has the upper hand, but the fight is not over yet. On the 
one hand, the organisation skilfully uses the adopted mechanisms of action, 
e.g. the use of cruelty, violence or proselytism and excessive enforcement of 
Sharia law, which currently make it attractive for a certain group of Muslims. 
On the other hand, in the long term, they may lead to the alienation of 
the organisation which, by failing to establish its cells and not undertaking 
cooperation with groups in other regions, would be deprived of support. 
In this way it will strain the long-term goals of the global ‘project’ of the 
proliferation of ideas of jihad, the ideas for which al-Qaeda, and perhaps 
above all al-Qaeda, has been striving for many years.
Exactly from this perspective the global clash of al-Qaeda with the Islamic 
State organisation could reduce the spread of the ideology of jihadism, which 
would contribute to the facilitation of counter terrorist activities. However, 
analysing the current activities of the IS, increased competition with al-Qaeda 
could led to the increase in demand for terrorist attacks in the West, to 
confirm the efficacy and the dominance of one party. Despite the fact that 
the prospect of a merger, or even a limited agreement between the two 
organisations is considered to be the most dangerous, it is possible that their 
rivalry constitutes a greater threat for international security. Therefore, 
the fear of the creation of a huge jihadist network under the leadership of 
al-Qaeda should be less worrisome than a scenario in which two parallel, 
competing structures are trying to prove their hegemony over the global 
jihadist movement through spectacular attacks in the West.
However, Al-Qaeda is going through a difficult period, because the IS is 
gaining influence both in Syria and Iraq. Taking into account the prospect of 
further successes, it is not currently strong enough to be able to resist this 
grouping. As we can see in Syria even militants of the al-Nusra Front are not 
able to restrain the IS. Currently, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are forced to 
try to regain lost territories. What is more, the caliphate created by the IS is 
a structure attractive for jihadists, and successes which the Islamic State has, 
in contrast to al-Qaeda which has not achieved major victories in the last 
decade, are attracting new members and the IS continues to build its prestige 
and legitimacy within the global Jihadist movement.
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GLOBAL ENCOUNTER. RIVARLY BETWEEN ISLAMIC STATE 
AND AL-QAEDA OVER THE SUPREMACY 
OF THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT
Summary
The aim of the article is the comparison of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, 
demonstrating similarities and differences between the two organisations. The 
main hypothesis of the research is the assumption that the Islamic State is 
different from al-Qaida primarily due to the fact that the main purpose of the 
organisation activity is to establish an Islamic state based on Sharia principles. 
This assumption is part of the strategy established by the deceased spiritual 
leader of the group – Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi. Despite the fact that the final 
strategic goal of al-Qaeda is now convergent with that of the Islamic State, 
al-Qaeda’s methods of operation developed under the leadership of Osama 
bin Laden focused on the destabilisation of the West and the Muslim support 
of liberation movements. In turn, the Islamic State focuses on the elimination 
of apostate regimes in the Arab world and establishment of the Caliphate. 
Currently the diversity of perspectives of leaders of both terrorist organisations, 
despite many similarities in the ideological issues, has led to a rivalry between 
the two factions for hegemony over the global jihadist movement.
GLOBALNE STARCIE. RYWALIZACJA PAŃSTWA ISLAMSKIEGO 
Z AL-KAIDĄ O HEGEMONIĘ NAD RUCHEM DŻIHADYSTOWSKIM
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest porównanie Państwa Islamskiego i Al-Kaidy, wykaza-
nie podobieństw łączących oraz różnic dzielących obie organizacje. Główną 
hipotezą badawczą jest założenie, że Państwo Islamskie różni się od Al-Kaidy 
przede wszystkim tym, że priorytetowym celem organizacji jest ustanowienie 
państwa islamskiego, opartego na zasadach szariatu. Założenie to jest częścią 
strategii ustanowionej przez zmarłego przywódcę duchowego grupy – Abu 
Musaba az-Zarkawiego. Pomimo, że ostateczny cel strategiczny Al-Kaidy 
jest obecnie zbieżny z działaniami Państwa Islamskiego, to metody działania 
Al-Kaidy opracowane pod przewodnictwem Osamy bin Ladena skoncentro-
wane są na destabilizacji Zachodu oraz wsparciu muzułmańskich ruchów 
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wyzwoleńczych. Z kolei Państwo Islamskie koncentruje się na likwidacji apo-
statycznych reżimów w świecie arabskim oraz ustanowieniu kalifatu. Obecnie 
owa odmienność perspektyw przywódców obu organizacji terrorystycznych, 
pomimo wielu podobieństw w kwestiach ideologicznych, doprowadziła do 
rywalizacji obu ugrupowań o hegemonię nad globalnym ruchem dżihady-
stowskim.
ГЛОБАЛЬНОЕ СТОЛКНОВЕНИЕ.  КОНКУРЕНЦИЯ 
МЕЖДУ ИСЛАМСКИМ ГОСУДАРСТВОМ И АЛЬ-КАИДОЙ 
В ВОПРОСЕ О ГЕГЕМОНИИ НАД ДВИЖЕНИЕМ ДЖИХАДА
Резюме
Целью статьи является сравнение Исламского государства и Аль-Каиды, 
определение объединяющих сходств и разделяющих различий между этими 
двумя организациями. Главной исследовательской гипотезой является пред-
посылка, что Исламское государство отличается от Аль-Каиды прежде всего 
тем, что приоритетной целью организации является создание исламского 
государства, основанного на принципах шариата. Данная предпосылка явля-
ется частью стратегии, разработанной покойным духовным лидером группы 
– Абу Мусаба аз Заркави. Несмотря на то, что окончательная стратегическая 
цель Аль-Каиды в настоящее время совпадает с деятельностью Исламского 
государства, методы действий Аль-Каиды, разработанные под руководством 
Осамы Биль-Ладена, концентрируются на дестабилизации Запада и поддер-
жке мусульманских освободительных движений. В свою очередь, Исламское 
государство концентрируется на ликвидации апостатичеких режимов в араб-
ском мире и установлении халифата. В настоящее время это несходство 
перспектив лидеров обеих террористических организаций, несмотря на мно-
жество сходных моментов в идеологических вопросах, привело к конкурен-
ции обеих группировок в борьбе за гегемонию над глобальным движением 
джихада.
